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marriage duly solemnized infacie ecclesice, and therefore that they
confer upon the wife the right of dower."
If the written contract entered into between these parties in the
presence of witnesses, one of whom was a clergyman, constitutes,
as we hold it does, a valid marriage per verba de prcesenti it can
make no difference if their previous relations were unlawful; nor
would the fact that either party afterwards denied the marriage be
sufficient to annul the contract.
The defendant derived title from Henry C. Mathewson. The
evidence goes to prove that a large part of the land, at the time it
was deeded was covered by tide-water, and therefore it is claimed
the title was in the state : Bailey v. Burges, 1. R. I. 330 ; but this
would not apply to the remaining portion, in which we hold the
complainant entitled to dower as the lawful widow of Henry C.
Mathewson. Rev. Stat, of R. 1., 1857, ch. 202, s. 1.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND. $
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.'
SUPREME COURT OP WISCONSIN.
BANK. 
•
When not responsible for Stock Certificate fraudulently issued by
Cashlier.-A. lent money to B. for his own use, and as security for its
repayment, and on his false representation that he owned, and had trans-
ferred to A. a certificate of stock to an equal amount in a national bank
of which B. was cashier, received from him such a certificate, written
by him in one of the printed forms which the president had signed and
left with him to be used if needed in the president's absence, and certi.
fying that A. was the owner of that amount of stock "transferable only
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions.
The cases will probably appear in 111 U. S. Reports.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freemau, Reporter; to appear in 109 Ill. Reports.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 61 Md. Rep.
4 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 40 or
41 Ohio St. Reports.
s From Hon. 0. M. Conover; to appear in 58 or 59 Wis. Rep.
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on the books of the btLnk on the surrender of this certificate," as was in
fact provided by its by-laws. B. did not surrender any certificate to
the bank, or make any transfer to A. upon its books; never repaid the
money lent, and was insolvent. The bank never ratified, or received
any benefit from the transaction: Held, that A. could not maintain an
action against the bank to recover the value of the certificate: Held,
also, that the action could not be supported by evidence that in one or
two other instances stock was issued by B. without any certificate having
been surrendered; and that shares, once owned by B., and which there
was evidence to show had been pledged by him to other persons before
the issue of the certificate to A., were afterwards transferred to the
president, with the approval of the directors, to secure a debt due
from B. to the bank, without further evidence that such issue of stock
by B. was known or recognised by the officers of the bank: Moores v.
Citizens' Nat. Bank of Piqua, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Agreement to give Time.-Indefinite Indulgence.-Right to Sue.-
Discharge of Endorsers.-After a promissory note had been protested,
the maker asked the holder "for additional time as a favor." The
holder said that he "was willing to show any reasonable favor." The
maker then said that he would give paper drawn on his customers, and
did so when he got it. No time for the indulgence was named : Held,
1. As the time granted was not specified, and the arrangement furnished
no means for determining it, the holder retained the right to sue the
maker at pleasure. 2. The fact that the maker afterwards delivered to
the holder drafts on his customers, did not cure this defect. 3. As the
proceeds of the drafts did not pay the note, the endorsers were not dis-
charged: Edwards v. The Bedford Chair Co., 40 or 41 Ohio St.
CERTIORARI.
Office of Writ-llow far discretionary-Who may appy.-At common
law the writ of certiorari was used principally in criminal cases, to
remove them from an inferior tribunal to the Court of King's Bench for
trial. The writ went as a matter of right on the application of the
Crowh, but when made by the defendant he was required to show cause.
As to a private person, the writ was not a writ of right, but cause had
to be shown by the petition: Board of Supervisors v. Magoon, 109 Ill.
The writ was also used to bring before the Court of King's Bench the
record of commissioners of the poor, and other rates, and in cases where
an individual was sued in a court having no jurisdiction, and no appeal
or writ of error was given by law, and in cases where the jurisdiction
had been exceeded, or it appeared that the proceeding was against the
law : Id.
_ A. person who prosecuted a petition to alter a road over his land
before the commissioners of highways, and was present at every step
taken, will not be allowed by certiorari to question the legality of the
proceeding in case the decision is adverse to him. If he acts in the
matter as though the proceeding was in conformity to the law, be will
be bound by the acts, and estopped from questioning its legality or
regularity : Id.
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COMMON CARRIER. See Negligence.
Railroad-Hauling Cars of another Company over its Line-Liability
for loss.-A railway company engaged in the transportation of freights
for hire as a common carrier, is bound to transport or haul upon its road
the cars of any other railroad company, when requested so to do, and
will hold the same relation as a common carrier to such cars that it does
to ordinary freight received by it for transportation, and in case of loss
will be held to the same measure and character of liability to the owner
of the cars so received for transportation, as would attach in respect to
any other property: Peoria and Pekin Union Railway Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island. and Pacific Railway Co,, 109 Ill.
In this case the defendant railroad company's principal business was
switching cars for other railroad companies. Its tracks were connected
with those of the other railroads by a transfer switch, and with mills,
elevators and manufactories in and around the city where its business
was transacted. The plaintiff corporation brought a car, loaded with
freight, to the city, and placed the same on the transfer track, with
orders to the defendant to ship the same to a certain distillery, to which
place it was taken and unloaded. When unloaded it was taken by the
defendant, without orders from the plaintiff, to a sugar refinery, to be
loaded, and then switched to. the transfer track for shipment. On the
same day the sugar refinery was burned, and also the car: Held, that
the defendant was liable, as a common carrier, to the plaintiff, for the
value of the car so destroyed : Id.
CORPORATION.
Enforcement of liability of stockholder-Failure to serve process on
Stockholder-Judgment.- n an action by a creditor of an insolvent
corporation to enforce the personal liability of its stockholders, where
the stockholders were not all before the court, and it did not appear that
those not served with process could not have been served it was error to
assess upon the stockholders served the whole amount of the indebted.
ness of the corporation: Bonewitz v. Van Wert County Bank, 40 or 41
Ohio St.
In such action it was error to give judgment for some of the stock-
holders releasing them from assessment, upon the finding that they did
not own stock at the time the liability sought to be enforced accrued: Itd.
Liability of Corporation of one State doing business in another to be
sued in latter-Executors and Administrators-Removal of Causes.-A
corporation of one state doing business in another under a law of the lat-
ter which compels it to always have there a resident attorney upon whom
all lawful process against the company may be served, may be sued in the
latter state on any simple contract (as a policy of insurance not under
seal) just as if that state were the only state in which the suit could be
brought. And if letters of administration must be taken out for the
purpose of the suit, the liability of the corporation to be sued in the
latter state makes such simple contract debt assets there for the purpose
of founding administration: New England Mutual Life Ins.. Co. v.
Woodworth, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
But in such a case as above the foreign corporation does not lose its
right to remove a suit brought against it in the state court, into. the
United States Court: Id.
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COURT.
Judicial Notice-Land located in Lake.-While the court takes judi-
cial notice of many things, such as the division of the state into
counties, and of the latter into townships, according to the government
surveys, it cannot take such notice of the flact that land located under
scrip is in a lake which is a navigable body of water, and hence not
subject to location: Wilcox v. Jackson, 109 111.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Voluntary Intoxication no defence- Temporary Insanity- Opinions
of Witnesses not Experts.-Temporary insanity produced immediately
by intoxication, furnishes ng excuse for the commission of a homicide
or other crime, but a fixed insanity does. Whether a party committing
a crime is under the influence of a fixed insanity, or a temporary one
induced immediately by intoxication, is a question of fact for the jury,
and their verdict will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the
evidence: Ustone v. The People, 109 Ill.
While it is true there must be a joint union of act and intention or
criminal negligence to constitute a criminal offence, yet when without
intoxication the law will impute to the act a criminal intent-as, in the
case of a wanton killing of another without provocation-voluntary
drunkenness is not available to disprove such intent, so as to reduce
the crime from murder to manslaughter : Id.
Voluntary intoxication furnishes no excuse for crime committed under
its influence, even if the intoxication is so extreme as to make the
author of the crime unconscious of what he is doing, or to create a
temporary insanity: Id.
On the trial of one for crime, the opinions of neighbors and
acquaintances of the defendant, who are not experts, may be given as
to his sanity or insanity, founded on their actual observations : Rd.
Appeal from Justice of the Peace-Jurisdiction.-If a judgment of
conviction has been pronounced by a justice of the peace, upon a valid
complaint, charging an offence which he had jurisdiction to hear, try
and determine, a regular appeal by the defendant from such judgment
confers jurisdiction upon the appellate court even though the justice
may have committed errors which divested his jurisdiction: State v.
.Boncher, 58 or 59 Wis.
Bastardy P.roceeding-E-idence.-A bastardy proceeding is uai-
criminal, and the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
to be the father of the child before he can be compelled to contribute
to its support: Van Tassel v. The State, 58 or 59 Wis.
A finding by the court in such a case, that the defendant is guilty
"upon a preponderance of the evidence, but not beyond a reasonable
doubt," is equivalent to an acquittal: Id.
DAMAGES. See Negligence.
Exemplary Damages- Counsel Fee.-Exemplary damages may be
allowed, where an agent, by false and fraudulent representations to his
principal, obtains possession of his principal's goods and converts them
to his own use: Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 40 or 41 Ohio St.
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The jury, in such a case, in estimating the damages, may include the
plaintiff's reasonable counsel fees as an item of compensation: Id.
Remote result-Disease caused by Ijiur-Predispositon to Disease.-
The female plaintiff having testified that shortly after the injury com-
plained of, a cancer was developed at the place on her person where she
was injured, and medical testimony having been offered on both sides
of the question, whether the cancer was the result of the injury, it was
held, 1. That it was for the jury to determine, as a matter of fact,
whether the cancer did result from the injury received. And in deter-
mining this question, they were required to consider all the circum-
stances and coincidences of the case in connection with the testimony
of the professional witnesses; 2. That if the jury believed from all the
evidence before them that the cancer was the natural and proximate
consequence of the blow received, by the negligent act of the defendant,
it would properly form an element to be considered in awarding damages
for the pain and injury suffered by the female plaintiff; 3. That the
fact that she may have had a tendency or predisposition to cancer, could
afford no proper ground of objection to her claim. The case of Hobbs
and Wife v. The London and Southwestern Railroad Co., L. R., 10
Q. B. 111, distinguished from this case, without intimating that this
court would accept that dedision as an authority in any case : Baltimore
City Pass. Railway Co. v. Kempt, 61 Md.
EJECTMENT.
Taz Deed-Recording.-Until a tax deed is properly recordea, the
grantee therein has no such right to the possession of the premise&
as will enable him to maintain ejectment therefor: Hewitt, Jr., v. Week,
58 or 59 Wis.
EQUITY.
Cancellation of Forged Bill-Discovery tenming to Criminate Defend-
ant.-A court of equity will vacate a forged paper or direct its surrender
for destruction, when the forgery or fraudulent character of the paper
is established by proof. A demurrer, therefore, which denies the right
to an injunction restraining the defendant from selling, assigning or
otherwise disposing of a certain single bill, purporting to be the single
bill of the complainant, and alleged by him to be a forgery, is too broad
and cannot be sustained: Dennison v. Yost, 61 Md.
Where a bill calls upon the defendant to answer charges which
impute to him a punishable offence against the law, he may assert his
privilege to be protected from being compelled to answer anything that
may criminate himself, by a demurrer to the bill: Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Order to Answer.-An appeal will not lie from an order requiring the
defendant to answer by a certain day, such order not being final: Den-
nison v. Wantz, 61 Md.
EVIDENCE.
Gratuitous Services-Burden of Proof-Evidence of Custom.-T he
question being whether certain services were rendered gratuitously,
evidence that a third person had been paid, or that it was customary to
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pay,, for similar services, is irrelevant: Kelly v. IToughton, 58 or
59 Wis.
When a party admits that services for which a claim is made against
him were rendered and were worth the sum claimed, but alleges that
they were rendered gratuitously, the burden of proof is upon him to
show that they were so rendered: 1l.
Parol to contradict Written Contract-Rule as to Strangers to .lstru-
ment.-The rule that the terms of a written contract must be shown by
the writings alone, and that oral testimony exhibiting the various
negotiations between the parties leading up to its consummation is to be
excluded, applies only as between the parties to written instruments,
and those claiming under them. St.rangers to a written instrument,
when their rights are concerned, are at liberty to show by parol evidence
that the contract of the parties is different from what it purports to be
on the face of the writing: Washburn & .oen .ffg. Co. v. Chicago
Galvanized Wire Pence Co., 109 Ill.
Thus, where a company claiming a patent upon an invention, settled
and aajusted a suit brought by it against another for an infringement
of the patent, and gave a license to manufacture under the patent upon
payment of a certain royalty by the licensee, the contract providing that
in case of any subsequent licenses being granted at a less royalty, the
first licensee should.only pay such reduced rate; on a bill by the latter
to enforce such agreement, he was allowed to show by parol that a sub-
sequent contract of settlement with another party, which on its face
appeared to be a grant of a license free of royalty, in payment of the
price for certain other patents transferred to the the licenser, was but a
contrivance and device to cover up and conceal the fact of a grant of a
license without royalty, or at a reduced rate: Id.
EIXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See Corpoation.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Agreement to be performed in One Year.-A verbal agreement to con-
struct a section of a road within a year and twenty days from the date of
contract was made by competent parties. The work could be ompleted
within the year, and the twenty days was a precaution against contin-
gencies : Held, this was not an "agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof;" and an action
thereon is not prohibited by the Statute of Frauds : Jones v. Pouch, 40
or 41 Ohio St.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Settlement by Husband on Wife-Direct conveyance to her.-A
husband may settle a portion of his property upon his wife, if he does
not thereby impair the claims of existing creditors and the settlement is
not intended as a cover to future schemes of fraud. His direct convey-
ance to her, when the fact that it is intended as such settlement is
declared in the instrument, or otherwise clearly established, will be
sustained in equity against the claims of creditors. The technical
reasons of the common law growing out of the unity of husband and
wife which preclude a conveyance between them upon a valuable con-
sideration, will not in such a cate prevail in equity and defeat his
purpose : Moore v. Page, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
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INTOXICATION. See Criminal Law.
MIUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Bonds of-Efect of Recitals in, and Cerhficates thereon.-Bonds were
issued by a county in excess of ten per cent. of the assessed valuation
of such county, which was the limit of the amount it had been legally
authorized to issue. The bonds contained recitals that they were issued
in pursuance of an election and under an Act of Assembly and the
state constitution, and the required certificates of certain officers were
endorsed on said bonds. .Held, that a purchaser, the amount, of the
bonds issued being known, could only protect himself by an examina-
tion of the assessment, "a public record equally accessible to all intend-
ing purchasers of bonds," and by calculation determining whether the
issue of bonds was within the limit: Dixon County v. .'ield, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1883.
Revocation of License- Certiorari- Costs.-Upon certiorari to review
the action of a common council in revoking a license without notice to
the licensee, the question is whether such proceeding was according to
law, and not whether the license had been so violated as to justify a
revocation: Common Council of Oshkosh v. State, 58 or 59 Wis.
The fact that such license expired about the time the proceedings
were reviewed on the certiorari does not affect the right of the licensee
to have the revocation set aside: Id.
The common council, in revoking a license, represents the city, and
where it has acted in good faith, though under a mistake as to its powers,
the costs on a proceeding by certiorari to review its action may be
adjudged to be paid by the city: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Damages.,
Fire from Threshing Machine- Contributory Negligence-Special
finding of Jury.-The defendants, who had contTacted to thresh the
plaintiff's grain, put in operation their steam-engine (used to furnish
power to the threshing-machine) within four rods and upon the windward
side of several stacks of grain, on a hot, dry day when the wind was
blowing a gale. The stacks were destroyed by fire communicated from
the engine. Held, that, although the engine was furnished with all
proper appliances to prevent the escape of fire, the defendants were
guilty of negligence: Martin v. Bishop, 58 or 59 Wis.
But the plaintiff, whose employees were assisting the defendants,
having directed the placing of the engine, and, though present and
knowing the danger, not having objected when it was put in operation,
was guilty of contributory negligence. The facts being undisputed, a
special finding of the jury that the plaintiff was not guilty of negli-
gence, held to be but erroneous conclusion of law : Id.
Contributory Negligence-Care bestowed after Injury-Remote Dam-
age.-A plaintiff cannot hold the defendant responsible for an injury to
himself caused even in part by his own fault in failing to use ordinary
care or ordinary judgment, or for any injury not resulting from the fault
of the defendant, but caused by some new intervening cause not inci-
dent to the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful act or omission
of duty: Pallman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 I1.
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In a case where the plaintiff's arm has been broken from the negli-
gent conduct of the defendant, and the plaintiff exercises ordinary care
to keep the parts together, and uses ordinary care in the selection of
surgeons and doctors, and nurses, if needed, and employs those of ordi-
nary skill and care in their profession, and still, by some unskilful or
negligent act of such surgeon, doctor or nurses, the bones fail to unite,
thereby making a false joint, the defendant, if responsible for the break-
ing of the arm, will be liable in damages for the unfavorable result of
the injury: Id.
ContributorySteppingfrom Train whil in. Motion.-A young man,
in vigorous health, strong, active, and in the full possession of all his phy-
sical and mental faculties, having a valise containing clothing, in his
right hand, and a basket of provisions on his left arm, attempted in
broad daylight, to leave a railway train while it was moving slowly, the
distance from the lower step of the car to the platform being only
eighteen inches, and in doing so was seriously injured. In an action
of damages against the railroad company, it was held, that under the
circumstances, in voluntarily stepping from the car when it was in motion,
and when he had not the free and unrestricted use of his hands and arms,
the plaintiff was not guilty of such negligence as would justify the court
in taking the case from the consideration of the jury: Cumberland
Valley Railroad Co. v. Maugans, 61 Md.
Contri'butorg Negligence- When no Excuse.-Altbough the plaintiff
may have been guilty of negligence, and such negligence may, in fact,
have remotely contributed to the production of the accident, yet, if the
defendant could, in the result, by the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence, in view of the circumstances of the case, have avoided the
accident, the plaintiff's negligence, being the more remote cause, will
not exeuse the defendant: .Kean v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
61 Md.
If the plaintiff, who was injured by the alleged negligence of the
railroad company, was, in fact, drunk, and failed to observe the reason-
able precautions to avoid danger to himself while in the act of crossing
the defendants' road tracks, or while upon the tracks of the road, though
improperly there, and under circumstances to constitute negligence on
his part, yet, if the defendants' servants in charge of the train, after
discovering the perilous situation of the plaintiff, could, by the exercise
of reasonable care and diligence, have avoided the accident, they were
bound to do so. If they possessed knowledge of the plaintiff's situa-
tion, and failed to make proper and reasonable exertions whereby he
cogld have been saved, the defendant would be liable, though it was by
reason of the negligence or drunken condition of the plaintiff that he
was found in the situation of danger. In such case, their failure to
use due care and exertion would constitute negligence, which would
form the direct and proximate cause of the injury. Id.
OFFICER.
Responsibility of Sureties on Offcial bond for wrongful taking under
an attachment of Goods of Third Party.-The taking of goods, upon a
writ of attachment, into the custody of the marshal, as the officer of the
court that issues the writ, is, whether the goods are the -property of the
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defendant in the writ or of any other person, an official act, and there-
fore, if wrongful, a breach of the bond given by the marshal for the
faithful performance of the duties of his office, and his sureties are lia-
ble: Lamon v. Feusier, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
PATENT.
When Re-issue is too broad Original Patent cannot be revived by Dis-
claimer.-Where a patentee, who has assigned his patent, with the con-
sent of his assignee applies for a re-issue, and in support of his applica-
tion makes an affidavit that he believes that, by reason of an insufficient
or defective specification the original letters patent are inoperative or
invalid, and a re-issue is thereupon obtained, which is void by reason of
being too broad, the original letters patent cannot be revived by a dis-
claimer of all the charges made in the re-issued patent. This could be
done only, if at all, by surrender of the re-issued patent and the grant
of another re-issue : AMurray v. Mallory, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1883.
PUBLIC PoLIcY.
Agreement as to Location of Railroad.-An agreement for the loca-
tion of the route of a railroad at a particular intermediate place is not
per se void as against public policy: B., 0. & C. Railroad Co. v. Ral-
ston, 40 or 41 Ohio St.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier; Negligence ; Public Policy.
Construction of Ordinance requiring a Fence along the Line of Road.
The right of way through Chicago was granted to a railroad by an
ordinance requiring it to build a suitable fence "of such height as
the common council may direct :" Held, that the obligation of the
railroad to build the fence was absolute,'and that the right reserved to
the council was only to give specific directions if it saw proper: Hayes
v. Mich. Vent. Railroad Co., S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1883.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See Corporation.
SALE.
Condilional Sale-Right of Property.-S. S. & Co. sold and delivered
a threshing-machine to K. upon the conditions: 1. That the title, own-
ership or possession of the machine should not pass from them to K.
until the notes given for the purchase price should be paid in full. 2.
That S. S. & Co. should have power to declare the notes, so given, due
at any time they should deem the debt insecure, and to sell the machine
at public or private sale and apply the proceeds upon the unpaid balance
of the purchase price. Held,.1. That under the first condition the pro-
perty in the machine did not pass to K. until he had paid the purchase
price. 2. That the right to sell the property and apply the proceeds, as
provided in the second condition, did not divest the sellers of their right
of property reserved in the first condition: Call v. Seymour, 40 or 41
Ohio St.
SuRETY. See Officer.
TAX. See .4jectment.
